We introduce the concept of "negative bubbles" as the mirror (but not necessarily exactly symmetric) image of standard financial bubbles, in which positive feedback mechanisms may lead to transient accelerating price falls. To model these negative bubbles, we adapt the Johansen-LedoitSornette (JLS) model of rational expectation bubbles with a hazard rate describing the collective buying pressure of noise traders. The price fall occurring during a transient negative bubble can be interpreted as an effective random down payment that rational agents accept to pay in the hope of profiting from the expected occurrence of a possible rally. We validate the model by showing that it has significant predictive power in identifying the times of major market rebounds. This result is obtained by using a general pattern recognition method that combines the information obtained at multiple times from a dynamical calibration of the JLS model. Error diagrams, Bayesian inference and trading strategies suggest that one can extract genuine information and obtain real skill from the calibration of negative bubbles with the JLS model. We conclude that negative bubbles are in general predictably associated with large rebounds or rallies, which are the mirror images of the crashes terminating standard bubbles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial bubbles are generally defined as transient upward acceleration of prices above fundamental value [12, 30, 43] . However, identifying unambiguously the presence of a bubble remains an unsolved problem in standard econometric and financial economic approaches [16, 33] , due to the fact that the fundamental value is in general poorly constrained and it is not possible to distinguish between exponentially growing fundamental price and exponentially growing bubble price.
To break this stalemate, Sornette and co-workers have proposed that bubbles are actually not characterized by exponential prices (sometimes referred to as "explosive"), but rather by faster-than-exponential growth of price (that should therefore be referred to as "superexplosive"). See [43] and references therein. The reason for such faster-than-exponential regimes is that imitation and herding behavior of noise traders and of boundedly rational agents create positive feedback in the valuation of assets, resulting in price processes that exhibit a finite-time singularity at some future time t c . See [15] for a general theory of finitetime singularities in ordinary differential equations, [14] for a classification and [26, 40, 45] for applications. This critical time t c is interpreted as the end of the bubble, which is often but not necessarily the time when a crash occurs [28] . Thus, the main difference with standard bubble models is that the underlying price process is considered to be intrinsically transient due to positive feedback mechanisms that create an unsustainable regime. Furthermore, the tension and competition between the value investors and the noise traders may create deviations around the finite-time singular growth in the form of oscillations that are periodic in the logarithm of the time to t c . Log-periodic oscillations appear to our clocks as peaks and valleys with progressively greater frequencies that eventually reach a point of no return, where the unsustainable growth has the highest probability of ending in a violent crash or gentle deflation of the bubble. Log-periodic oscillations are associated with the symmetry of discrete scale invariance, a partial breaking of the symmetry of continuous scale invariance, and occurs in complex systems characterized by a hierarchy of scales. See [42] for a general review and references therein.
Recent literatures on bubbles and crashes can be summarized as the following kinds: first, the combined effects of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints may cause large movements in asset. In this kind of models, the asset prices are determined at equilibrium to the extent that they reflect the heterogeneous beliefs about payoffs. But short sales restrictions force the pessimistic investors out of the market, leaving only optimistic investors and thus inflated asset price levels. However, when short sales restrictions no longer bind investors, then prices fall back down [1, 7, 11, 17, 20, 32, 35, 41] . While in the second type, the role of "noise traders" in fostering positive feedback trading has been emphasized.
These models says trend chasing by one class of agents produces momentum in stock prices [2, 9, 10, 18] . The empirical evidence on momentum strategies can be found in [4, 21, 22] .
After the discussion on bubbles and crashes, the literatures on rebound should be summarized also. On the theoretical side, there are several competing explanations for price decreases followed by reversals: liquidity and time-varying risk. [39] stresses the importance of liquidity: as more people sell, agents who borrowed money to buy assets are forced to sell too. When forced selling stops, this trend reverses. [38] shows that it is risky to be a fundamental trader in this environment and that price reversals after declines are likely to be higher when there is more risk in the price, as measured by volatility. On the empirical front concerning the forecast of reversals in price drops, [21] shows that the simplest way to predict prices is to look at past performance. [5] shows that price-dividend ratios forecast future returns for the market as a whole. However, these two approaches do not aim at predicting and cannot determine the most probable rebound time for a single ticker of the stock. The innovation of our methodology in this respect is to provide a very detailed method to detect rebound of any given ticker.
In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that financial bubbles have mirror images in the form of "negative bubbles" in which positive feedback mechanisms may lead to transient accelerating price falls. We adapt the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model of rational expectation bubbles [24, 25, 29] to negative bubbles. The crash hazard rate becomes the rally hazard rate, which quantifies the probability per unit time that the market rebounds in a strong rally. The upward accelerating bullish price characterizing a bubble, which was the return that rational investors require as a remuneration for being exposed to crash risk, becomes a downward accelerating bearish price of the negative bubble, which can be interpreted as the cost that rational agents accept to pay to profit from a possible future rally. During this accelerating downward trend, a tiny reversal could be a strong signal for all the investors who are seeking the profit from the possible future rally. These investors will long the stock immediately after this tiny reversal. As a consequence, the price rebounds very rapidly. This paper contributes to the literature by augmenting the evidence for transient pockets of predictability that are characterized by faster-than-exponential growth or decay. This is done by adding the phenomenology and modeling of "negative bubbles" to the evidence for characteristic signatures of (positive) bubbles. Both positive and negative bubbles are suggested to result from the same fundamental mechanisms, involving imitation and herding behavior which create positive feedbacks. By such a generalization within the same theoretical framework, we hope to contribute to the development of a genuine science of bubbles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 summarizes the main definitions and properties of the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) for (positive) bubbles and their associated crashes. Section 2.2 presents the modified JLS model for negative bubbles and their associated rebounds (or rallies). The subsequent sections test the JLS model for negative bubbles by providing different validation steps, in terms of prediction skills of actual rebounds and of abnormal returns of trading strategies derived from the model. Section 3 describes the method we have developed to test whether the adapted JLS model for negative bubbles has indeed skills in forecasting large rebounds. This method uses a robust pattern recognition framework build on the information obtained from the calibration of the adapted JLS model to the financial prices. Section 4 presents the results of the tests concerning the performance of the method of section 3 with respect to the advanced diagnostic of large rebounds. Section 5 develops simple trading strategies based on the method of section 3, which are shown to exhibit statistically significant returns, when compared with random strategies without skills with otherwise comparable attributes. Section 6 concludes.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL FOR DETECTING REBOUNDS
A. Introduction to the JLS model and bubble conditions [25] , [29] , [24] developed a model (referred to below as the JLS model) of financial bubbles and crashes, which is an extension of the rational expectation bubble model of [3] . In this model, a crash is seen as an event potentially terminating the run-up of a bubble. A financial bubble is modeled as a regime of accelerating (super-exponential power law) growth punctuated by short-lived corrections organized according the symmetry of discrete scale invariance [42] . The super-exponential power law is argued to result from positive feedback resulting from noise trader decisions that tend to enhance deviations from fundamental valuation in an accelerating spiral.
In the JLS model, the dynamics of stock markets is described as dp
where p is the stock market price, µ is the drift (or trend) and dW is the increment of a
Wiener process (with zero mean and unit variance). The term dj represents a discontinuous jump such that dj = 0 before the crash and dj = 1 after the crash occurs. The loss amplitude associated with the occurrence of a crash is determined by the parameter κ. The assumption of the constant jump size is easily relaxed by considering a distribution of jump sizes, with the condition that its first moment exists. Then, the no-arbitrage condition is expressed similarly with κ replaced by its mean. Each successive crash corresponds to a jump of dj by one unit. The dynamics of the jumps is governed by a crash hazard rate h(t). Since h(t)dt is the probability that the crash occurs between t and t + dt conditional on the fact that it
has not yet happened, we have
and therefore
Under the assumption of the JLS model, noise traders exhibit collective herding behaviors that may destabilize the market. The JLS model assumes that the aggregate effect of noise traders can be accounted for by the following dynamics of the crash hazard rate
The intuition behind this specification (3) has been presented at length in [24, 25, 29] , among others, and further developed in (Sornette and Johansen, 2002) for the power law part and by [19] and (Zhou et al., 2005) for the second term in the right-hand-side of expression (3) . In a nutshell, the power law behavior ∼ t c − t) m−1 embodies the mechanism of positive feedback posited to be at the source of the bubbles. If the exponent m < 1, the crash hazard may diverge as t approaches a critical time t c , corresponding to the end of the bubble. The cosine term in the r.h.s. of (3) takes into account the existence of a possible hierarchical cascade of panic acceleration punctuating the course of the bubble, resulting either from a preexisting hierarchy in noise trader sizes [44] and/or from the interplay between market price impact inertia and nonlinear fundamental value investing [19] .
The no-arbitrage condition reads E t [dp] = 0, where the expectation is performed with respect to the risk-neutral measure, and in the frame of the risk-free rate. This is the standard condition that the price process is a martingale. Taking the expectation of expression (1) under the filtration (or history) until time t reads
Since E t [dW ] = 0 and E t [dj] = h(t)dt (equation (2)), together with the no-arbitrage condition E t [dp] = 0, this yields
This result (5) expresses that the return µ(t) is controlled by the risk of the crash quantified by its crash hazard rate h(t).
Now, conditioned on the fact that no crash occurs, equation (1) is simply dp
Its conditional expectation leads to E t dp p = κh(t)dt .
Substituting with the expression (3) for h(t) and integrating yields the so-called log-periodic power law (LPPL) equation:
where by a change of growth rate rather than by a crash or rebound. For m < 1, the crash hazard rate accelerates up to t c but its integral up to t which controls the total probability for a crash to occur up to t remains finite and less than 1 for all times t ≤ t c . It is this property that makes it rational for investors to remain invested knowing that a bubble is developing and that a crash is looming. Indeed, there is still a finite probability that no crash will occur during the lifetime of the bubble. The excess return µ(t) = κh(t) is the remuneration that investors require to remain invested in the bubbly asset, which is exposed to a crash risk.
The condition that the price remains finite at all time, including t c , imposes that m > 0.
Within the JLS framework, a bubble is qualified when the crash hazard rate accelerates.
According to (3) , this imposes m < 1 and B ′ > 0, hence B < 0 since m > 0 by the condition that the price remains finite. We thus have a first condition for a bubble to occur
By definition, the crash rate should be non-negative. This imposes [48] 
B. Modified JLS model for "negative bubbles" and rebounds
As recalled above, in the JLS framework, financial bubbles are defined as transient regimes of faster-than-exponential price growth resulting from positive feedbacks. We refer to these regimes as "positive bubbles." We propose that positive feedbacks leading to increasing amplitude of the price momentum can also occur in a downward price regime and that transient regimes of faster-than-exponential downward acceleration can exist. We refer to these regimes as "negative bubbles." In a "positive" bubble regime, the larger the price is, the larger the increase of future price. In a "negative bubble" regime, the smaller the price, the larger is the decrease of future price. In a positive bubble, the positive feedback results from over-optimistic expectations of future returns leading to self-fulfilling but transient unsustainable price appreciations. In a negative bubble, the positive feedbacks reflect the rampant pessimism fueled by short positions leading investors to run away from the market which spirals downwards also in a self-fulfilling process.
The symmetry between positive and negative bubbles is obvious for currencies. If a currency A appreciates abnormally against another currency B following a faster-thanexponential trajectory, the value of currency B expressed in currency A will correspondingly fall faster-than-exponentially in a downward spiral. In this example, the negative bubble is simply obtained by taking the inverse of the price, since the value of currency A in units of B is the inverse of the value of currency B in units of A. Using logarithm of prices, this corresponds to a change of sign, hence the "mirror" effect mentioned above.
The JLS model provides a suitable framework to describe negative bubbles, with the only modifications that both the expected excess return µ(t) and the crash amplitude κ become negative (hence the term "negative" bubble). Thus, µ becomes the expected (negative) return (i.e., loss) that investors accept to bear, given that they anticipate a potential rebound or rally of amplitude |κ|. Symmetrically to the case of positive bubbles, the price loss before the potential rebound plays the role of a random payment that the investors honor in order to remain invested and profit from the possible rally. The hazard rate h(t) now describes the probability per unit time for the rebound to occur. The fundamental equations (3) and (8) then hold mutatis mutandis with the inequalities
being the opposite to those corresponding to a positive bubble as described in the preceding
subsection.
An example of the calibration of a negative bubble with the JLS model (4) to the S&P 500 index from 1973-01-01 to 1974-10-01 is shown in the upper panel of Figure 1 . During this period, the S&P 500 index decreased at an accelerating pace. This price fall was accompanied by very clear oscillations that are log-periodic in time, as described by the cosine term in formula (4) . Notice that the end of the decreasing market is followed by a dramatic rebound in index price. We hypothesize that, similar to a crash following an unsustainable superexponential price appreciation (a positive bubble), an accelerating downward price trajectory (a negative bubble) is in general followed by a strong rebound. Furthermore, in order to suggest that this phenomenon is not an isolated phenomenon but actually happens widely in all kinds of markets, another example in the foreign exchange market is presented in the lower panel of Figure 1 . The USD/EUR change rate from 2006-07-01 to 2008-04-01 also underwent a significant drawdown with very clear log-periodic oscillations, followed by a strong positive rebound. One of the goals of this paper is to identify such regions of negative bubbles in financial time series and then use a pattern recognition method to distinguish ones that were (in a back-testing framework) followed by significant price rises.
In financial markets, large positive returns are less frequent than large negative returns, as expressed for instance in the skewness of return distributions. However, when studying drawdowns and drawups (i.e., runs of same sign returns). Johansen and Sornette found that, for individual companies, there are approximately twice as many large rallies as crashes with amplitude larger than 20% with durations of a few days [27] .
III. REBOUND PREDICTION METHOD
We adapt the pattern recognition method of [13] The last day of our tested time series is 2009-06-03.
A. Fitting methods
We first divide our S&P 500 index time series into different sub-windows (t 1 , t 2 ) of length dt ≡ t 2 − t 1 according to the following rules:
1. The earliest start time of the windows is t 1 = 1950-01-03. Other start times t 1 are calculated using a step size of dt 1 = 50 calendar days.
2. The latest end time of the windows is t 2 = 2009-06-03. Other end times t 2 are calculated with a negative step size dt 2 = −50 calendar days.
3. The minimum window size dt min = 110 calendar days.
4. The maximum window size dt max = 1500 calendar days.
These rules lead to 11,662 windows in the S&P 500 time series.
For each window, the log of the S&P 500 index is fit with the JLS equation (8) . The fit is performed in two steps. First, the linear parameters A, B and C are slaved to the nonlinear parameters by solving them analytically as a function of the nonlinear parameters.
We refer to [24] (page 238 and following ones), which gives the detailed equations and procedure. Then, the search space is obtained as a 4 dimensional parameter space representing m, ω, φ, t c . A heuristic search implementing the Tabu algorithm [8] is used to find initial estimates of the parameters which are then passed to a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [31, 34] to minimize the residuals (the sum of the squares of the differences) between the model and the data. The bounds of the search space are:
We choose these bounds because m has to be between 0 and 1 according to the discussion before; the log-angular frequency ω should be greater than 0. The upper bound 40 is large enough to catch high-frequency oscillations (though we later discard fits with ω > 20); phase φ should be between 0 and 2π; as we are predicting a critical time in financial markets, the critical time should be after the end of the time series we are fitting. Finally, the upper bound of the critical time should not be too far away from the end of the time series since predictive capacity degrades far beyond t 2 . We have empirically found elsewhere [23] one-third of the interval width to be a good cut-off.
The combination of the heuristic and optimization results in a set of parameters A, B, C, m, ω, φ and t c for each of the 11,662 windows. Of these parameter sets, 2,568 satisfy the negative bubble condition (11) . In Figure 2 , we plot the histogram of critical time t c for these negative bubble fits and the negative logarithm of the S&P 500 time series. Peaks in this time series, then, indicate minima of the prices, many of these peaks being preceded by a fast acceleration with upward curvature indicating visually a faster-than-exponential growth of −p(t). This translates into accelerating downward prices. Notice that many of these peaks of − ln p(t) are followed by sharp drops, that is, fast rebounds in the regular + ln p(t). We see that peaks in − ln p(t) correspond to peaks in the negative bubble t c histogram, implying that the negative bubbles qualified by the JLS model are often followed by rebounds. This suggests the possibility to diagnose negative bubbles and their demise in the form of a rebound or rally. If correct, this hypothesis would extend the proposition [23, 47] , that financial bubbles can be diagnosed before their end and their termination time can be determined with an accuracy better than chance, to negative bubble regimes associated with downward price regimes. We quantify this observation below.
B. Definition of rebound
The aim is first to recognize different patterns in the S&P 500 index from the 11,662 fits and then use the subset of 2,568 negative bubble fits to identify specific negative bubble characteristics. These characteristics will then be used to 'predict' (in a back-testing sense)
negative bubbles and rebounds in the future.
We first define a rebound, note as Rbd. A day d is a rebound Rbd if the price on that day is the minimum price in a window of 200 days before and 200 days after it. That is,
where P d is the adjusted closing price on day d. We find 19 rebounds of the ±200-days type [51] in the 59 year S&P 500 index history. Our task is to diagnose such rebounds in advance. We could also use other numbers instead of 200 to define a rebound. The predictability is stable with respect to a change of this number. This is because we learn from the learning set with a certain number type of rebounds and try to predict the rebounds of the same type. Later we will also show the results for ±365-days type of rebounds.
C. Definitions and concepts needed to set up the pattern recognition method
In what follows we describe a hierarchy of descriptive and quantitative terms as follows.
• learning set. A subset of the whole set which only contains the fits with critical times in the past. We learn the properties of historical rebounds from this set and develop the predictions based on these properties.
• classes. Two classes of fits are defined according to whether the critical time of a given fit is near some rebound or not, where 'near' will be defined below.
• groups. A given group contains all fits of a given window size.
• informative parameters. Informative parameters are the distinguishing parameters of fits in the same group but different classes.
• questionnaires. Based on the value of an informative parameter, one can ask if a certain trading day is a start of rebound or not. The answer series generated by all the informative parameters is called questionnaire.
• traits. Traits are extracted from questionnaire. They are short and contain crucial information and properties of a questionnaire.
• features. Traits showing the specific property of a single class are selected to be the feature of that class.
• rebound alarm index. An index developed from features to show the probability that a certain day is a rebound.
In this paper, we will show how all the above objects are constructed. Our final goal is to make predictions for the rebound time. The development of the rebound alarm index will enable us to achieve our goal. Several methodologies are presented to quantify the performance of the predictions.
D. Classes
In the pattern recognition method of [13] , one should define the learning set to find characteristics that will then be used to make predictions. We designate all fits before Jan.
1, 1975 as the learning set Σ 1 :
There are 4,591 fits in this set, which we all use without any pre-selection. No pre-selection for instance using Eq. (11) is applied, on the basis of the robustness of the pattern recognition method. We then distinguish two different classes from Σ 1 based on the critical time t c of the fits. For a single fit f with critical time t c,f , if this critical time is within D days of a rebound, then we assign fit f to Class I, represented by the symbol C I . Otherwise, f is assigned to Class II, represented by the symbol C II . For this study, we chose D = 10 days because D too big will lose precision and D too small will take the noise into account. In this case, Class I fits are those with t c within 10 days of one of the 19 rebounds. We formalize this rule as:
To be clear, Class I is formed by all the fits in learning set Σ 1 which have a critical time t c within 10 days of one of the rebounds. All of the fits in the learning set which are not in Class I are in Class II.
E. Groups
We also categorize all fits into separate groups (in addition to the two classes defined above) based on the length of the fit interval, L f = dt = t 2 − t 1 . We generate 14 groups, where a given group G i is defined by:
All 4,591 fits in the learning set are placed into one of these 14 groups.
F. Informative Parameters
For each fit in the learning set, we take 6 parameters to construct a flag that determines the characteristics of classes. These 6 parameters are m, ω, φ and B from Eq. (8), b (the negative bubble condition) from Eq. (10) and q as the residual of the fit.
We categorize these sets of 6 parameters for fits which are in the same group and same class. Then for each class-group combination, we calculate the probability density function (pdf) of each parameter using the adaptive kernel method [49] , generating 168 pdfs (6 parameters × 2 classes × 14 groups).
We compare the similarity (defined below) of the pdfs of each of the six parameters that are in the same group (window length) but different classes (proximity of t c to a rebound date). If these two pdfs are similar, then we ignore this parameter in this group. If the pdfs are different, we record this parameter of this group as an informative parameter. The maximum number of possible informative parameters is 84 (6 parameters × 14 groups).
We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov method [6] to detect the difference between pdfs. If the maximum difference of the cumulative distribution functions (integral of pdf) between two classes exceeds 5%, then this is an informative parameter. We want to assign a uniquely determined integer IP l to each informative parameter. We can do so by using three indexes, i, j and l. The index i indicates which group, with i ∈ [1, 14] . The index j indicates the parameter, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 refer to m, ω, φ, B, b, q, respectively. Finally, l represents the actual informative parameter. Assuming that there are L informative parameters in total and using the indexes, IP l is then calculated via
Given the L informative parameters IP l , we consider the pdfs for the two different classes of a single informative parameter. The set of abscissa values within the allowed range given by equations (12 -15) , for which the pdf of Class I is larger than the pdf of Class II, defines the domain Rg I,l ('good region') of this informative parameter which is associated with Class I. The other values of the informative parameters for which the pdf of Class I is smaller than the pdf of Class II define the domain Rg II,l which is associated with Class II. These regions play a crucial role in the generation of questionnaires in the next section.
Our hypothesis is that many "positive" and "negative bubbles" share the same structure described by the JLS model, because they result from the same underlying herding mechanism. However, nothing a priori imposes that the control parameters should be identical.
Note that our pattern recognition methodology specifically extract the typical informative parameter ranges that characterize the "negative bubbles".
G. Intermediate summary
We realize that many new terms are being introduced, so in an attempt to be absolutely clear, we briefly summarize the method to this point. We sub-divide a time series into many windows (t 1 , t 2 ) of length L f = t 2 − t 1 . For each window, we obtain a set of parameters that best fit the model (8) . Each of these windows will be assigned one of two classes and one of For each informative parameter, we find the regions of the abscissa of the pdf for which the Class I pdf (fits with t c close to a rebound) is greater than the Class II pdf. For informative parameter l (defined in (22) ), this region is designated as Rg I,l . In the next section, we will use these regions to create questionnaires that will be used to predictively identify negative bubbles that will be followed by rebounds.
Another important distinction to remember at this point is that the above method has been used to find informative parameters that will be used below. Informative parameters are associated with a class and a group.
H. Questionnaires
Using the informative parameters and their pdfs described above, we can generate questionnaires for each day of the learning or testing set. Questionnaires will be used to identify negative bubbles that will be followed by rebounds. The algorithm for generating questionnaires is the following:
1. Obtain the maximum (t cmax ) and minimum (t cmin ) values of t c from some subset Σ sub , either the 'learning' set or the 'predicting (testing)' set of all 11,662 fits.
2. Scan each day t scan from t cmin to t cmax . There will be N = t cmax − t cmin + 1 days to scan. For each scan day, create a new set S tscan consisting of all fits in subset Σ sub that have a t c near the scan day t scan , where 'near' is defined using the same criterion used for defining the two classes, namely D = 10 days:
The number #S tscan of fits in each set can be 0 or greater. The sum of the number of fits found in all of the sets tcmax tscan=t cmin #S tscan can actually be greater than the total number of fits in Σ sub since some fits can be in multiple sets. Notice that the fits in each set S tscan can (and do) have varying window lengths. At this point, only the proximity to a scan day is used to determine inclusion in a scan set.
3. Assign a group to each of the fits in S tscan . Recall that groups are defined in Eq. (21) and are based on the window length L f = dt = t 2 − t 1 . •
Using all sets S
, we say that fits near t scan cannot be identified and so
• If m 1 , m 2 / ∈ [A, B], fits near t scan belong to Class II and a IP 19 = −1.
More succinctly,
For each of the informative parameters, we get an answer a that says that fits near t scan belong to Class I or II (or cannot be determined). For a total of L informative parameters, we get a questionnaire A of length L:
Qualitatively, these questionnaires describe our judgement to whether t scan is a rebound or not. This judgement depends on the observations of informative parameters.
I. Traits
The concept of a trait is developed to describe the property of the questionnaire for each t scan . Each questionnaire can be decomposed into a fixed number of traits if the length of questionnaire is fixed.
From any questionnaire with length L, we generate a series of traits by the following method. Every trait is a series of 4 to 6 integers, τ = p, q, r, (P, Q, R). The first three terms p, q and r are simply integers. The term (P, Q, R) represents a string of 1 to 3 integers. We first describe p, q and r and then the (P, Q, R) term.
The integers p, q and r have limits: p ∈ 1, 2, . . . , L, q ∈ p, p + 1, . . . , L, r ∈ q, q + 1, . . . , L.
We select all the possible combinations of bits from the questionnaire A tscan with the condition that each time the number of selected questions is at most 3. We record the numbers of the selected positions and sort them. The terms p, q and r are selected position numbers and defined as follows:
• If only one position i 1 is selected:
• If three i 1 , i 2 , i 3 are selected:
The term (P, Q, R) is defined as follows:
As an example, A = (0,1,-1,-1) has traits in Table II . 
J. Features
At the risk of being redundant, it is worth briefly summarizing again. Until now we have: L informative parameters IP 1 , IP 2 , . . . , IP L from 84 different parameters (84 = 6 parameters × 14 Groups) and a series of questionnaires A tscan for each t scan from t cmin to t cmax using set S tscan . These questionnaires depend upon which subset Σ sub of fits is chosen.
Each questionnaire has a sequence of traits that describe the property of this questionnaire in a short and clear way. Now we generate features for both classes.
Recall that the subset of fits Σ f eature that we use here is that which contains all fits which have a critical time t c earlier than t p = 1975-01-01, Σ f eature = {f | t c,f < t p }. By imposing that t 2 and t c,f are both smaller than t p , we do not use any future information.
Considering the boundary condition of critical times in Eq. (15), the end time of a certain fit t 2 is less than or equal to t c . Additionally, we select only those critical times such that t c,f < t p , ∀f ∈ Σ f eature .
Assume that there are two sets of traits T I and T II corresponding to Class I and Class II, respectively. Scan day by day the date t from the smallest t c in Σ f eature until t p . If t is near a rebound (using the same D = 10 day criterion as before), then all traits generated by questionnaire A t belong to T I . Otherwise, all traits generated by A t belong to T II .
Count the frequencies of a single trait τ in T I and T II . If τ is in T I for more than α times and in T II for less than β times, then we call this trait τ a feature F I of Class I.
Similarly, if τ is in T I for less than α times and in T II for more than β times, then we call τ a feature F II of Class II. The pair (α, β) is defined as a feature qualification. We will vary this qualification to optimize the back tests and predictions.
K. Rebound alarm index
The final piece in our methodology is to define a rebound alarm index that will be used in the forward testing to 'predict' rebounds. Two types of rebound alarm index are developed.
One is for the back tests before 1975-01-01, as we have already used the information before this time to generate informative parameters and features. The other alarm index is for the prediction tests. We generate this prediction rebound alarm index using only the information before a certain time and then try to predict rebounds in the 'future' beyond that time.
IV. BACK TESTING A. Features of learning set
Recall that a feature is a trait which frequently appears in one class but rarely in the other class. Features are associated with feature qualification pairs (α, β). Using all the fits from subset Σ f eature found in Sec. III J, we generate the questionnaires for each day in the learning set, i.e., the fits with t c before 1975-01-01. Take all traits from the questionnaire A t for a particular day t and compare them with features F I and F II . The number of traits in F I and F II are called ν t,I and ν t,II . Then we define:
From the definition, we can see that RI t ∈ [0, 1]. If RI t is high, then we expect that this day has a high probability that the rebound will start.
We choose feature qualification pair (10, 200) here, meaning that a certain trait must appear in trait Class I at least 11 times and must appear in trait Class II less than 200 times. If so, then we say that this trait is a feature of Class I. If, on the other hand, the trait appears 10 times or less in Class I or appears 200 times or more in Class II, then this trait is a feature of Class II. The result of this feature qualification is shown in Figure 3 .
Note that the choice (10, 200) is somewhat arbitrary and does not constitute an in-sample optimization on our part. This can be checked from the error diagrams presented below, which scan these numbers: one can observe in particular that the pair (10, 200) does not give the best performance. We have also investigated the impact of changing other parameters and find a strong robustness.
With this feature qualification, the rebound alarm index can distinguish rebounds with high significance. If the first number α is too big and the second number β is too small, then the total number of Class I features will be very small and the number of features in Class II will be large. This makes the rebound alarm index always close to 0. In contrast, if α is too small and β is too large, the rebound alarm index will often be close to 1. Neither of these cases, then, is qualified to be a good rebound alarm index to indicate the start of the next 
B. Predictions
Once we generate the Class I and II features of the learning set for values of t c before t p (Jan. 1, 1975) , we then use these features to generate the predictions on the data after t p .
Recall that the windows that we fit are defined such that the end time t 2 increases 50 days from one window to the next. Also note that all predictions made on days between these 50 days will be the same because there is no new fit information between, say, t n 2 and t n−1 2 .
Assume that we make a prediction at time t:
t ∈ (t 2 , t 2 + 50], t > t p (30) Then the fits set Σ t 2 = {f | t 2,f ≤ t 2 } is made using the past information before prediction day t. We use Σ t 2 as the subset Σ sub mentioned in Sec. III H to generate the questionnaire on day t and the traits for this questionnaire. Comparing these traits with features F I and F II allows us to generate a rebound alarm index RI t using the same method as described in Concerning the false negative (missed rebound) in 1990, the explanation is probably that the historical prices preceeding this rebound does not follow the JLS model specification.
Rebounds may result from several mechanisms and the JLS model only provides one of them, arguably the most important. Overall, the predictability of the rebound alarm index shown in Figure 4 , as well as the relative cost of the two types of errors (false positives and false negatives) can be quantified systematically, as explained in the following sections. The major conclusion is that the rebound alarm index has a prediction skill much better than luck, as quantified by error diagrams.
C. Error Diagram
We have qualitatively seen that the feature qualifications method using back testing and forward prediction can generate a rebound alarm index that seems to detect and predict well observed rebounds in the S&P 500 index. We now quantify the quality of these predictions with the use of error diagrams [36, 37] . We create an error diagram for predictions after 1975-01-01 with a certain feature qualification in the following way: In this way, we will mark 9 points in the error diagram for the 9 rebounds.
The aim of using such an error diagram in general is to show that a given prediction scheme performs better than random. A random prediction follows the line y = 1 − x in the error diagram. A set of points below this line indicates that the prediction is better than randomly choosing alarms. The prediction is seen to improve as more error diagram points are found near the origin (0, 0). The advantage of error diagrams is to avoid discussing how different observers would rate the quality of predictions in terms of the relative importance of avoiding the occurrence of false positive alarms and of false negative missed rebounds.
By presenting the full error diagram, we thus sample all possible preferences and the unique criterion is that the error diagram curve be shown to be statistically significantly below the anti-diagonal y = 1 − x.
In Figure 5 , we show error diagrams for different feature qualification pairs (α, β). Note the 9 points representing the 9 rebounds in the prediction set. We also plot the 11 points of the error diagrams for the learning set in Figure 6 .
As a different test of the quality of this pattern recognition procedure, we repeated the entire process but with a rebound now defined as the minimum price within a window of 2 × 365 days [52] instead of 2 × 200 days, as before. These results are shown in Figures 7-8 .
D. Bayesian inference
Given a value of the predictive rebound alarm index, we can also use the historical rebound alarm index combined with Bayesian inference to calculate the probability that this value of the rebound alarm index will actually be followed by a rebound. We use predictions near 3. Calculate D Lv , the number of days which have a rebound alarm index greater than or equal to Lv.
4. The probability that the rebound alarm index is higher than Lv is estimated by
5. The probability of a day being near the bottom of a rebound is estimated as the number of days near real rebounds over the total number of days in the predicting set:
where N rebound is the number of rebounds we can detect after 1975-01-01 and D rw is the rebound width, i.e. the number of days near the real rebound in which we can say that this is a successful prediction. For example, if we say that the prediction is good when the predicted rebound time and real rebound time are within 10 days of each other, then the rebound width D rw = 10 × 2 + 1 = 21.
6. The probability that the neighbor of a rebound has a rebound alarm index larger than
Lv is estimated as
where N 0 is the number of rebounds in which sup |d−rebound|≤20
7. Given that the rebound alarm index is higher than Lv, the probability that the rebound will happen in this period is given by Bayesian inference:
Averaging P (rebound|RI ≥ Lv) for all the different feature qualifications gives the probability that the end of November 2008 is a rebound as 0.044. By comparing with observations, we see that this period is not a rebound. We obtain a similar result by increasing the definition of rebound from 200 days before and after a local minimum to 365 days, yielding a probability of 0.060.
When we decrease the definition to 100 days, the probability that this period is a rebound jumps to 0.597. The reason for this sudden jump is shown in Figure 9 where we see the index around this period and the S&P 500 index value. From the figure, we find that this period is a local minimum within 100 days, not more. This is consistent with what Bayesian inference tells us. However, we have to address that the more obvious rebound in March 2009 is missing in our rebound alarm index. Technically, one can easily find that this is because the end of crash is not consistent with the beginning of rebound in this special period.
In this case, we then test all the days after 1985-01-01 systematically by Bayesian inference using only prediction data (rebound alarm index) after 1975-01-01. To show that the probability that RI ≥ Lv is stable, we cannot start Bayesian inference too close to the initial predictions so we choose 1985-01-01 as the beginning time. We have 5 'bottoms' (troughs) after this date, using the definition of a minimum within ±200 days.
For a given day d after 1985-01-01, we know all values of the rebound alarm index from 1975-01-01 to that day. Then we use this index and historical data of the asset price time series in this time range to calculate the probability that d is the bottom of the trough,
given that the rebound alarm index is larger than Lv, where Lv is defined as
To simplify the test, we only consider the case of feature qualification pair (10, 200) , meaning that the trait is a feature of Class I only if it shows in Class I more than 10 times and in Class II less than 200 times. Figure 10 shows that the actual rebounds occur near the local highest probability of rebound calculated by Bayesian inference. This figure also illustrates the existence of false positive alarms, i.e., large peaks of the probability not associated with rebounds that we have characterized unambiguously at the time scale of ±200 days.
V. TRADING STRATEGY
In order to determine if the predictive power of our method provides a genuine and useful information gain, it is necessary to estimate the excess return it could generate. The excess return is the real return minus the risk free rate transformed from annualized to the duration of this period. The annualized 3-month US treasury bill rate is used as the risk free rate in this paper. We thus develop a trading strategy based on the rebound alarm index as follows. When the rebound alarm index rises higher than a threshold value T h, then with a lag of Os days, we buy the asset. This entry strategy is complemented by the following exit strategy. When the rebound alarm index goes below T h, we still hold the stock for another
Hp days, with one exception. Consider the case that the rebound alarm index goes below T h at time t 1 and then rises above T h again at time t 2 . If t 2 − t 1 is smaller than the holding period Hp, then we continue to hold the stock until the next time when the rebound alarm index remains below T h for Hp days.
The performance of this strategy for some fixed values of the parameters is compared with random strategies, which share all the properties except for the timing of entries and exits determined by the rebound alarm index and the above rules. The random strategies consist in buying and selling at random times, with the constraint that the total holding period (sum of the holding days over all trades in a given strategy) is the same as in the realized strategy that we test. Implementing 1000 times these constrained random strategies with different random number realizations provide the confidence intervals to assess whether the performance of our strategy can be attributed to real skill or just to luck.
Results of this comparison are shown in Table III for two sets of parameter values. The pvalue is a measure of the strategies' performance, calculated as the fraction of corresponding random strategies that are better than or equal to our strategies. The lower the p-value is, the better the strategy is compared to the random portfolios. We see that all of our strategies' cumulative excess returns are among the top 5-6% out of 1000 corresponding random strategies' cumulative excess returns. Box plots for each of the strategies are also presented in Figures 11-12 .
The cumulative returns as well as the cumulative excess returns obtained with the two strategies as a function of time are shown in Figures 13-14 . These results suggest that these two strategies would provide significant positive excess return. Of course, the performance obtained here are smaller than the naive buy-and-hold strategy, consisting in buying at the beginning of the period and just holding the position. The comparison with the buy-andhold strategy would be however unfair as our strategy is quite seldom invested in the market.
Our goal here is not to do better than any other strategy but to determine the statistical significance of a specific signal. For this, the correct method is to compare with random strategies that are invested in the market the same fraction of time. It is obvious that we could improve the performance of our strategy by combining the alarm indexes of bubbles and of negative bubbles, for instance, but this is not the goal here.
We also provide the Sharpe ratio as a measure of the excess return (or risk premium) per unit of risk. We define it per trade as follows
where R is the return of a trade, R f is the risk free rate (we use the 3-month US treasury bill rate) transformed from annualized to the duration of this trade given in Table III and σ is the standard deviation of the returns per trade. The higher the Sharpe ratio is, the higher the excess return under the same risk.
The bias ratio is defined as the number of trades with a positive return within one standard deviation divided by one plus the number of trades which have a negative return within one standard deviation:
In Eq. (38), r is the excess return of a trade and σ is the standard deviation of the excess returns. This ratio detects valuation bias.
To see the performance of our strategies, we also check all the possible random trades with a holding period equals to the average duration of our strategies, namely 25 days and 17 days for strategy I and II respectively. The average Sharpe and bias ratios of these random trades are shown in Table III . Both Sharpe and bias ratios of our strategies are greater than those of the random trades, confirming that our strategies deliver a larger excess return with a stronger asymmetry towards positive versus negative returns.
As another test, we select randomly the same number of random trades as in our strategies, making sure that there is no overlap between the selected trades. We calculate the Sharpe and bias ratios for these random trades. Repeating this random comparative selection 1000 times provides us with p-values for the Sharpe ratio and for bias ratio of our strategies. The results are presented in Table III . All the p-values are found quite small, confirming that our strategies perform well.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a systematic method to detect rebounds in financial markets using "negative bubbles," defined as the symmetric of bubbles with respect to a horizontal line,
i.e., downward accelerated price drops. The aggregation of thousands of calibrations in running windows of the negative bubble model on financial data has been performed using a general pattern recognition method, leading to the calculation of a rebound alarm index.
Performance metrics have been presented in the form of error diagrams, of Bayesian inference to determine the probability of rebounds and of trading strategies derived from the rebound alarm index dynamics. These different measures suggest that the rebound alarm index provides genuine information and suggest predictive ability. The implemented trading strategies outperform randomly chosen portfolios constructed with the same statistical characteristics. This suggests that financial markets may be characterized by transient positive feedbacks leading to accelerated drawdowns, which develop similarly to but as mirror images of upward accelerating bubbles. Our key result is that these negative bubbles have been shown to be predictably associated with large rebounds or rallies.
In summary, we have expanded the evidence for the possibility to diagnose bubbles before they terminate [47] , by adding the phenomenology and modeling of "negative bubbles" and their anticipatory relationship with rebounds. The present paper contributes to improving our understanding of the most dramatic anomalies exhibited by financial markets in the form of extraordinary deviations from fundamental prices (both upward and downward) and of extreme crashes and rallies. Our results suggest a common underlying origin to both positive and negative bubbles in the form of transient positive feedbacks leading to identifiable and reproducible faster-than-exponential price signatures. 
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